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The Seventh Circuit, in its recent decision, In re Slave 
Descendants Litigation, dismissed the claims of plaintiffs seeking 
disgorgement of the profits earned by Northern companies as a result 
of their illegal involvement in slavery.1 It is the latest in a long line of 
reparations cases dismissed by courts for various reasons, including 
lack of standing and statute of limitations.  
Part One of this Comment outlines the history of Northern 
involvement in slavery. Part Two traces the legal hurdles faced by 
African American plaintiffs during and after the statutory time period 
in which to bring reparations claims. Part Three explores the law of 
reparations, and the relevant case law. Part Four of this Comment 
delineates the holdings of the district court and the Seventh Circuit 
opinion in Slave Descendants. Part Five explains the various tolling 
doctrines available to courts to remedy time-barred claims. Part Six 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A. 2000, Swarthmore College. 
1 In re African American Slave Descendants Litigation (“Slave Descendants”), 
471 F.3d 754, 763 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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outlines the manner in which the court should have applied the 
standard for equitable estoppel, and the considerations of efficiency, 
equity, and history such an application would have satisfied. 
 
I.  NORTHERN INVOLVEMENT IN SLAVERY 
 
Slavery was an incredibly profitable endeavor that supported 
America’s economy in its infancy.2 However, many Americans are not 
aware of the North’s extensive involvement in slavery. To remedy that 
knowledge gap, Hartford Courant reporters Anne Farrow, Joel Lang, 
and Jenifer Frank recently published Complicity: How the North 
Promoted, Prolonged, and Profited from Slavery.3 In it, they chronicle 
the history of slavery in the North as well as the involvement of 
Northern companies in slavery. Though most people know that 
farmers and plantation owners in Southern states enslaved Africans 
and their descendants, the Northern system of slavery is far less 
infamous. In the 1760s, residents of Northern states, including New 
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, owned and housed as 
many as 41,000 Africans.4 Just as their Southern counterparts did, 
Northern slave owners bought and sold their slaves, separating 
children from parents and husbands from wives. Northern slaves slept 
on floors in attics, cellars, and barns, without blankets or clothing, 
where conditions were far colder than in the South.5 They could not 
freely travel, associate or educate themselves under the law.6 Slave 
owners routinely whipped slaves of all ages for violating these rules, 
or for any number of other reasons, and received no punishment for 
murdering a slave.7  
                                                 
2 Burt Neuborne, Holocaust Reparations Litigation: Lessons for the Slavery 
Reparations Movement, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 615, 620 (2003). 
3 ANNE FARROW, ET AL., COMPLICITY: HOW THE NORTH PROMOTED, 
PROLONGED, AND PROFITED FROM SLAVERY (2006). 
4 Id. at 62.  
5 Id at 63.  
6 Id.  
7 Id. at 62.  
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At the same time, Northern slave trading posts supplied the 
demands of Northern residents for slaves.8 Rhode Island had a virtual 
monopoly on the “importation” of slaves, and controlled more than 
two-thirds of the American colonies’ slave trade with Africa.9 After 
Congress banned the trafficking of African slaves in 1808, Rhode 
Island continued to import slaves.10 As late as 1860, after the slave 
trade in Rhode Island had waned, New York City was the American 
capital of a massive international illegal slave trade, supplying slaves 
to markets in Brazil and Cuba.11 New Yorkers built and sold slave 
ships designed to transport 600 to 1000 people each; the ships 
contained crates of shackles and large water tanks.12 Slave traders 
generally evaded prosecution or bribed juries if indicted.13 When a 
Northern court convicted one notorious New York slave trader in 
1861, 11,000 of his outraged fellow New Yorkers petitioned Abraham 
Lincoln to pardon him. 
 
II.  AFRICAN AMERICAN ACCESS TO COURT SYSTEMS 
 
While the Civil War unequivocally changed America, it did not 
ameliorate slavery’s effects. The composition of the Union army 
evidenced the change. By 1865, one out of every four Union soldiers 
was African American—either Northern free blacks or escaped 
slaves.14 In the antebellum South, these same soldiers did not enjoy 
what was termed in the nineteenth century “the basic rights of 
personhood under the law.”15 Blacks were excluded from the right to 
marry, follow trade, travel, own land or property, enter into contracts, 
                                                 
8 Id. at 95. 
9 Id.  
10 Id.  
11 Id at 112.  
12 Id. at 121 
13 Id. at 122.  
14 GARRETT EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND 
THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 20 (2006).  
15 Id. at 31.  
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testify in court, and seek judicial remedy.16 The Framers of the 
Constitution viewed these civil rights as more fundamental than 
political rights. Political rights included the right to serve on juries and 
the right to vote, and the Framers granted political rights only to white 
land-owning men.17 This hierarchy of rights endured through the Civil 
War and into Reconstruction, where a reunified America countenanced 
at most only fundamental civil rights for African Americans.18 Though 
the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery in 1865, Southern States 
adopted “Black Codes” in response that denied blacks the citizenship 
rights granted to them by the Thirteenth Amendment.19 Congress 
ratified the Fourteenth Amendment to grant civil rights to African 
Americans, notwithstanding strong dispute from formerly Confederate 
states and several Northern states, including New Jersey, Ohio, and 
Oregon.20  
In 1873, The Supreme Court confronted the Fourteenth 
Amendment in The Slaughter-House Cases.21 The Court narrowly 
interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to guarantee only federal 
enforcement of the privileges and immunities of citizenship, but left 
states free to determine the citizenship status of its residents 
individually.22 The Court restricted the power of the Fourteenth 
Amendment further in the 1883 Civil Rights Cases.23 There the court 
held that the Fourteenth Amendment barred only discrimination in 
state action, but that private racial discrimination was an unprotected 
social matter.24 The Court thus granted judicial approval to the 
                                                 
16 Id.  
17 Id.  
18 Id. at 31-32. 
19 Norman Redlich, “Out, Damned Spot; Out, I Say.” The Persistence of Race 
In American Law. 25 VT. L. REV. 475, 484 (2001).  
20 Id. at 240-253.  
21 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
22 Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., From Brown to Tulsa: Defining Our Own Future, 47 
HOW. L. J. 499, 501 (2004). 
23 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
24 Id. 
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division between civil, political, and social rights, protecting only the 
most fundamental of civil rights for blacks.25 This approach was 
sanctioned by Congress, since many of its members from both the 
North and South were uncomfortable with the concept of African 
Americans as social equals.26  
In Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court continued its trend of separating 
civil and social rights.27 The Plaintiff in Plessy was an African 
American male who purchased a first class train ticket, but was 
instructed by the train’s conductor to move to the second class 
smoking car or disembark the train.28 Mr. Plessy argued that the 
Louisiana state law that segregated railroad cars was unconstitutional. 
The Court held that “equal, but separate” segregated rail coaches did 
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.29 The Court’s decision 
demonstrates the fallacy of separate but equal; that first class cars were 
“better” than second class ones is discernible from their descending 
monikers and price. While Plessy intended to further separate civil 
from social rights, it simultaneously demonstrated that blacks did not 
have meaningful access to either type of right. Where Mr. Plessy 
entered into a contract for a first class ticket, his race entitled him to 
only a second class one. While subsequent decisions in the 1940s and 
1950s found that black students were entitled to admission to various 
graduate schools on equal protection grounds, the Supreme Court did 
not overturn Plessy.30  
Political and fundamental civil rights were also unavailable to 
blacks in the first half of the Twentieth century. Many Southern states 
disenfranchised African Americans by enacting “grandfather clauses,” 
which made having an ancestor that was a legal citizen during slavery 
                                                 
25 Redlich, supra note 19, at 484.  
26 Id.  
27 163 U.S. 537 (1896).  
28 Id. at 538. 
29 Id. at 547.  
30 See, e.g., Sipuel v. Bd of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948); 
Sweat v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
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a requirement of voting.31 Others held whites-only primaries, which 
the Supreme Court held were constitutional until its decision in Smith 
v. Allwright in 1944. 32 Even freedom from enslavement was not 
certain, and many African Americans agricultural workers returned to 
virtual slavery in a system known as peonage. Black farm workers 
toiled for money that was often printed by the plantation owners 
themselves, and redeemable only at the plantation store.33 Another 
common example of peonage was where plantation owners entered 
into contracts with black farm workers with no intent to ever pay 
them; the system endured well into the 1940s thanks to state statutes 
that protected it.34  
While peonage was common in the agricultural South, access to 
civil, political, and social rights was far from easy in the North for 
African Americans. Between 1880 and 1930, seventy-nine blacks were 
lynched in the North.35 Racial riots were common, and the City of 
Chicago allowed rioters to attack African Americans and their property 
for four days until it intervened; over 500 people were injured.36 
While the basic safety of African Americans may have improved 
in the period after the Supreme Court found public segregation 
unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education, that decision did not 
immediately improve social rights for blacks.37 Many schools in 
Northern and Midwestern states, such as Delaware and Missouri, 
remained segregated well into the 1960s in violation of Brown.38 Even 
where states complied with Brown, schools remained segregated due 
                                                 
31 Ogletree, supra note 22.  
32 321 U.S. 649 (1944).  
33 Ogletree, supra note 22. 
34 MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 233 (2004). See also Taylor v. 
Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942) and Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944), holding 
that Georgia and Florida peonage statues were unconstitutional.  
35 Ogletree, supra note 22, at 503. 
36 Id.  
37 Brown v. Board of Ed. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
38 KLARMAN, supra note 34, at 347.  
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to residential patterns, known as de facto segregation.39 De facto 
segregation currently continues to deprive African American children 
of education. A 1973 lawsuit attempted to remedy this problem in 
Denver; however, the Supreme Court refused to find that de facto 
segregation was a violation of Brown.40 In Keyes v. School District No. 
1, the Supreme Court held that only segregation that results from 
intentional government action (de jure segregation) violates Equal 
Protection.41 Just recently, the Court held that school attendance 
schemes in Seattle and Louisville intended to remedy de facto 
segregation and provide the benefit of integrated schooling to all 
students violated Equal Protection to white students under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.42 In a vehement dissent, Justice Breyer 
argued that the plurality decision broke the promise of Brown.43 “This 
is a decision that the Court and the Nation will come to regret,” he 
portended.44  
In the decisions subsequent to Brown, the Court’s jurisprudence 
maintained the racial status quo rather than remedied it. In 1976, the 
Court in Washington v. Davis held that an Equal Protection violation 
requires a “discriminatory purpose,” rather than merely a 
discriminatory effect.45 As noted reparations scholar Charles Ogletree 
pointed out, Justice Blackmun believed his colleagues misperceived 
the state of racial inequality in the late 1980s.46 In Justice Blackmun’s 
dissent from an opinion finding that a class of salmon cannery workers 
failed to establish the racism they experienced in the workplace was a 
constitutional violation in their employment, Blackmun described the 
workers’ employment setting as being “organized on principles of 
                                                 
39 Id. 
40 Redlich, supra note 19, at 496. 
41 Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
42 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 127 S. 
Ct. 2738, (2007).  
43 Id. at 2837 
44 Id.  
45 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
46 Ogletree, supra note 22, at 498. 
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racist stratification and segregation. In more blatant language, Justice 
Stevens stated that the workplace conditions, responsibilities, and 
housing were so inferior for black workers as to create a virtual 
“plantation economy.”47 Justice Blackmun lamented, “[o]ne wonders 
whether the majority still believes that race discrimination . . . is a 
problem in our society, or even remembers that it ever was.”48 
The current collective consciousness of America and the 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court embody the shortsightedness that 
so disturbed Justice Blackmun. The country and the Court are laboring 
under the myth of a post-racist society, as evidenced by the lack of 
success of slavery reparations litigation. Reparation suits, which seek 
restitution for slavery, are naturally met with hostility in a legal system 
that refuses to acknowledge the continuing effects of slavery on the 
black community. In light of the legal history recounted here, one feels 
the same incredulity that Justice Blackmun did when Judge Posner 
stated in Slave Descendants that African Americans could have 
successfully brought reparations claims within the early part of the last 
century.49 In which Twentieth Century court would African Americans 
have had meaningful access to restitution for slavery: that which 
denied their most basic rights, or that which pretended they have 
always had those rights? 
  
III.  HISTORY OF REPARATIONS 
 
In order to understand the significance of the Slave Descendants 
decision, we must explore its place in the continuum of reparations 
jurisprudence. Reparations refers to any legal or political scheme that 
1) provides payment (in cash, trust, or social programs) to a large 
group of claimants, 2) based on wrongs permitted under the law at the 
time, 3) which current law may bar through a strict application of 
sovereign immunity, statute of limitations or standing, and 4) which 
                                                 
47 Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 662 (1989). 
48 Id.  
49 In re African American Slave Descendants Litigation (“Slave 
Descendants”), 471 F. 3d 754, 762 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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principles of corrective justice and restitution justify.50 The third part 
of its definition demonstrates that reparations are a problematic 
pursuit. The traditional paradigm of a plaintiff recovering from a 
defendant that wronged her in the recent past works poorly where 
defendant’s wrong is a systematic denial of plaintiff’s access to civil, 
political, and social rights and opportunities, for the purpose of 
preserving defendant’s sociopolitical dominance over plaintiff.51  
Reparations suits arise from abhorrent wrongs. Past cases include 
class action litigation for recovery from the government for the 
internment of Japanese-American citizens during World War II, and 
claims against German companies for their unjust profits from the use 
of slave labor during the same time.52 The difficulty of success in 
reparations suits demonstrates that courts often do not believe that the 
gravity of such injuries outweigh legal formalities such as statutes of 
limitations.53 However, these lawsuits resulted in legislation or extra-
judicial agreements for restitution each in the amount of more than one 
billion dollars.54  
Courts summarily dismissed early African American reparations 
litigation. In Johnson. v. McAdoo, plaintiffs were former slaves and 
descendants of slaves that sought an equitable lien on U.S. Treasury 
funds acquired during slavery from cotton taxes.55 In one short 
paragraph, the court held that the true defendant was not the U.S. 
Treasurer, as named in the suit, but instead the U.S. government, 
which was immune from suit.56  
                                                 
50 Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other 
Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 691 (2003).  
51 Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and 
African American Claims, 40 B. C. L. REV. 477, 488 (1998).  
52 Hohri v. United States., 586 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1984), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part, 782 F. 2d 227 (1986), vacated, 482 U.S. 64 (1987), on remand, 847 F. 2d 
779 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 925 (1988); D’Amato v. Deutsche Bank, 236 F. 3d 
78 (2d Cir. 2001).  
53 Id.; see also, Slave Descendants. 
54 Yamamoto, supra note 51, at 696, Tables 1 and 2.  
55 Johnson v. McAdoo, 45 App. D. C. 440 (1916).  
56 Id. at 441. 
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Subsequent suits were also unsuccessful. In an unreported 
decision, the Northern District of California dismissed plaintiff’s claim 
to the 40 acres and a mule, or the cash equivalent, guaranteed to his 
descendants by the Freedman’s Bureau after the Civil War.57 It 
reasoned that plaintiff’s case reinforced the need for statutes of 
limitations in order to “prevent surprises through the revival of 
claims.”58 One year later, the same court dismissed a claim against the 
United States for damages from slavery, which the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed on the grounds of sovereign immunity, lack of standing, and 
statute of limitations.59 In Cato v. United States, the plaintiffs 
analogized their claim to Native American reparations claims in which 
the statute of limitations was tolled for far longer than plaintiffs 
requested, but the court differentiated the African American plaintiffs 
because they did not have an analogous treaty relationship with the 
federal government.60 The court concluded that continuing 
discrimination did not toll the statute of limitations, either.  
More recently, plaintiffs brought a suit seeking restitution for 
slavery pursuant to the Civil Liberties Act (“CLA”), an act which 
Congress intended to remedy the injustice of Japanese-American 
internment during World War II.61 Plaintiffs claimed that denying their 
claims under the CLA violated the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.62 The court held that 
the CLA barred claims of non-Japanese citizens and the act survived 
judicial scrutiny.63 It reasoned that there are many other groups that 
have been wronged by the “unhappy aspects of American history” that 
                                                 
57 Berry v. United States, No. C-94-0796-DLJ, 1994 WL 374537 at *3 (N.D. 
Cal. 1994). 
58 Id.  
59 Cato v. United States, 70 F. 3d 1103 (9th Cir. 1995). 
60 Alfred L. Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in Reparations for 
Slavery, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 513 (2003).  
61 Obadele v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 432 (Fed. Cl. 2002), affirmed per 
curium, 61 Fed. Appx. 705 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  
62 Id. at 441. 
63 Id.  
10
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the CLA does not address, and so the Act’s application to Japanese 
Americans did not extend to African Americans.64 
Those “unhappy aspects of American history” were the cause of a 
reparations suit based on a race riot in Tulsa, Oklahoma in 
1921.Though not a slavery reparations case the plaintiffs in Alexander 
v. Oklahoma did argue that the court should apply an equitable tolling 
doctrine to claims barred by statute of limitations. Alexander 
demonstrates the difficulty experienced by plaintiffs in even the 
strongest and most recent reparations cases.65 A young African 
American male had been accused of assaulting a white teenage girl.66 
Fearing a lynching, about fifty black residents of the African American 
neighborhood in Tulsa, known as Greenwood, went to the jail to stop 
it.67 White residents of Tulsa confronted the Greenwood citizens at the 
courthouse and a melee ensued.68 In response, the police department 
deputized and armed hundreds of white men with machine guns, and 
the mayor of Tulsa called in the National Guard.69 The deputized 
citizens and the Guardsmen invaded Greenwood in an attempt to 
destroy it.70 A small group of Black World War I veterans attempted to 
defend their neighborhood.71 The Guardsmen fired on the town with a 
machine gun mounted to the top of a truck.72 The next day, conditions 
worsened.73 The Guardsmen arrested and transported the residents of 
Greenwood to buildings for “protective custody,” while the white 
deputies burned the newly emptied homes and businesses.74 According 
to the court’s findings of fact, the “angry white mob converged on 
                                                 
64 Id. at 442.  
65 See Alexander v. Oklahoma, 382 F. 3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2004). 
66 Id. at 1211-12. 
67 Id.  
68 Id.  
69 Id.  
70 Id.  
71 Id.  
72 Id.  
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
11
Lutz: The Death Knell Tolls for Reparations in <em>In re African-Americ
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2008
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                         Volume 3, Issue 2                        Spring 2008 
 
 543
Greenwood in a devastating assault . . . killing up to three hundred 
people, and leaving thousands homeless.”75 When the mob finished, it 
had burned forty-two square blocks of Greenwood to the ground.76  
On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the court should apply an 
equitable tolling doctrine to the statute of limitations. They claimed 
that they could not have discovered the full involvement of the city of 
Tulsa—which was responsible for deputizing and arming the mob, and 
for arresting the citizens of Greenwood—until it investigated the 
events and published a report in 2001.77 The court found that the 
plaintiffs knew of their injury at the time it happened, and that the 
plaintiff did not need to know the cause of the injury to trigger the 
statute of limitations.78 The court advised that plaintiffs must use 
reasonable diligence in discovering the facts giving rise to a claim.79 
However, the court did not address the fact that during the statutory 
period closely following the riot, Tulsa promised to compensate the 
victims, but then ignored their requests for compensation.80 Nor did it 
address how a 1920s court in Oklahoma would have realistically 
received such claims in light of African Americans’ lack of meaningful 











                                                 
75 Id.  
76 Id. at 1212.  
77 Id.  
78 Id. at 1216.  
79 Id.  
80 Ogletree, supra note 22, at 571. 
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IV.  SLAVE DESCENDANTS OPINIONS 
 




Plaintiffs81 consisting of former slaves alleging post-Civil War 
enslavement, representatives of slaves, and descendants of slaves, filed 
nine separate suits in varied jurisdictions seeking reparations on behalf 
of all African Americans against Defendant companies for their 
involvement in slavery.82 The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 
transferred the suits to the Northern District of Illinois for consolidated 
proceedings, at which point Plaintiffs filed a consolidated complaint. 83 
In that complaint, Plaintiffs sought relief in the form of an accounting, 
disgorgement of profits, restitution, compensatory damages, punitive 
damages, and the creation of a historical commission to study the 
actions of Defendant companies and their predecessors in interest.84 
Plaintiffs also requested that the court disburse monetary awards into a 
constructive public trust. 
 
 
                                                 
81 Plaintiffs are Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, Mary Lacey Madison, Andre 
Carrington, John Bankhead, as administrator of the Estate of Edlee Bankhead, 
Richard Barber, Sr., Hannah Hurdle-Toomey, as administrator of the Estate of 
Andrew Jackson Hurdle, Marcelle Porter, as administrator of the Estate of Hettie 
Pierce, Julie Mae Wyatt-Kervin, the Estate of Emma Marie Clark, Ina Bell Daniels 
Hurdle McGee, Cain Wall Sr., and Antoinette Harrell Miller. 
82 In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 737 
(N.D. Ill. 2005). 
83 In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 
1038 (N.D. Ill. 2004).  
84 Defendants are FleetBoston Financial Corporation, CSX Corporation, Aetna 
Inc., Brown Brothers Harriman & Company, New York Life Insurance Company, 
Norfolk Southern Corporation, Lehman Brothers Corporation, Lloyd’s of London, 
Union Pacific Railroad, JP Morgan Chase, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Brown 
and Williamson, Liggett Group Inc., Canadian National Railway, Southern Mutual 
Insurance Company, American International Group, and Loews Corporation. 
13
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2. Plaintiffs Claims against Defendants 
 
In their Second Consolidated and Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs 
alleged the following: Defendants conspired to commit tortious acts; 
converted the property rights slaves had in themselves; were unjustly 
enriched through slave labor; fraudulently concealed a cause of action 
for replevin from the estates of Plaintiffs; violated Plaintiffs’ 
constitutional rights to inherit and convey property by restricting 
former slaves’ access to corporate records demonstrating Defendants’ 
participation in slavery; intentionally and negligently inflicted 
emotional distress; and violated state consumer protection laws by 
fraudulently concealing material facts regarding their involvement in 
slavery from Plaintiff consumers.85  
Plaintiffs alleged that the predecessors to Defendant banks made 
loans to slave traders and collected customs duties on ships 
transporting slaves.86 Defendant railroads are successors-in-interest to 
railroad lines that were allegedly constructed, in part, by slave labor, 
and that transported slaves.87 Predecessors to Defendant insurance 
companies allegedly issued insurance policies on the lives of slaves 
with slave owners as beneficiaries and insured ships transporting 
slaves.88 Defendant Brown Brothers Harriman allegedly accepted 
slaves as collateral for loans, eventually owning up to 346 slaves.89 
Significantly, Plaintiffs alleged in most counts that Defendants 
performed these acts in violation of Northern laws applicable to them 
at the time, and that Defendants made intentional misrepresentations 
about their involvement in slavery.90 
 
 
                                                 
85 Second Consolidated and Amended Complaint at ¶ 258-366, In re African-
American Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 737 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
86 Id. at ¶ 125-223. 
87 Id. at ¶ 125-223.  
88 Id.  
89 Id. at ¶ 148. 
90 Id. at ¶ 125-223. 
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In his opinion for the Northern District of Illinois, Judge Norgle 
dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice.91 He held that Plaintiffs 
lacked standing because they did not establish “to a virtual certainty 
that they have suffered concrete, individualized harms at the hands of 
Defendants,”92 and because their claim to their ancestor’s lost wages 
was “conjectural.”93 Plaintiffs also lacked standing, according to Judge 
Norgle, because their Complaint did not allege a sufficient causal 
connection between the named Defendants’ acts and Plaintiffs’ 
ancestors,94 and because Plaintiffs may not assert the legal rights of 
third-parties by virtue of their ancestry alone.95  
Judge Norgle agreed with Defendants that the political question 
doctrine and various statutes of limitations barred Plaintiffs’ claims. 
He held that the issue of reparations was not justiciable because it is 
political in nature, and the legislative branch acted on the issue when 
it, for example, created the Freedman’s Bureau, ratified the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution, and 
enacted numerous Civil Rights Acts.96 Even if it were justiciable, he 
held that the statutes of limitations on all but the consumer protection 
fraud claims would have accrued by 1865 at the latest, and that 
Plaintiffs did not give “concrete instances of material representations 
that have been made by Defendants” within the statutory periods.97 
Judge Norgle declined to toll or delay the accrual of the statutes of 
limitations because “Plaintiffs’ ancestors knew or should have known 
[either while they were slaves or in the years after Emancipation] that 
they were being brutalized and wrongfully forced to work,” and the 
                                                 
91 In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 737 
(N.D. Ill. 2005). 
92 Id. at 747 (internal quotations omitted). 
93 Id. at 748-9. 
94 Id. at 753. 
95 Id.  
96 Id. at 756-9. 
97 Id. at 773. 
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defendants did not conceal the injury of slavery because it was “quite 
obvious when inflicted.”98  
 
B. Seventh Circuit Opinion 
 
Judge Posner, in a succinct nine-page opinion for the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals, modified in part and reversed in part the 
ruling of the district court.99 He held that the political question 
doctrine did not bar Plaintiffs’ claims because Plaintiffs sought 
“conventional legal relief” from the court by asking it to apply state 
and federal law to Defendants’ conduct.100 However, he dismissed 
without prejudice all of the claims in the complaint for lack of 
standing, save for those of the representatives of the slaves.101 He 
reasoned that Plaintiffs could not possibly connect Defendants’ 
wrongful acts with their financial harm, and the causal chain would be 
so long that a court would merely be speculating as to the amount of 
damages.102 Judge Posner reached the merits of the claims of plaintiffs 
representing the estates of former slaves, holding that, as actual slaves, 
they did have a concrete injury that granted them standing to sue.103 
However, he dismissed their claims with prejudice as time-barred by 
the statute of limitations.104  
According to Judge Posner, tolling doctrines do not apply because 
they cannot extend the time to sue by more than a century.105 He 
reasoned that in the years immediately following the Civil War former 
slaves could have received a fair hearing on these matters in Northern 
courts, and that the descendants of slaves have had decades of 
                                                 
98 Id. at 776-9. 
99 In re African American Slave Descendants Litigation (“Slave 
Descendants”), 471 F. 3d 754, 763 (7th Cir. 2006).  
100 Id. at 758.  
101 Id. at 763. 
102 Id. at 759.  
103 Id. at 762. 
104 Id.  
105 Id.  
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effective access to courts in the South.106 However, he reversed the 
dismissal of the consumer protection fraud claims.107 In a consumer 
fraud protection claim, where a seller misrepresents information 
material to some class of buyers fearing he will lose those buyers if 
they knew the truth, he perpetrates a fraud on those buyers.108 Judge 
Posner remanded the consumer protection fraud claims for further 
proceedings to determine whether Defendants misrepresented 
information regarding their involvement in slavery to Plaintiffs, 
causing them to purchase products they would not have purchased 
otherwise.109  
 
V. VARIOUS TOLLING DOCTRINES 
 
A. Equitable Estoppel 
 
Plaintiffs argued that the court should impose one of the various 
tolling doctrines to their time-barred claims.110 One such tolling 
doctrine is the “discovery rule.” According to Judge Posner in Cada v. 
Baxter Healthcare Corp., the discovery rule does not actually toll, or 
halt, the statute of limitations, but instead delays its commencement 
“from the date when the plaintiff is wronged to the date when he 
discovers he has been injured.”111 A doctrine “within the domain of the 
discovery rule”112 is equitable estoppel, where the defendant takes 
steps to conceal the injury to the plaintiff, thus delaying the accrual of 
the statute of limitations until the time when “the plaintiff has 
discovered . . . or should have discovered, that the defendant injured 
him.”113 The defendant is estopped from defending the claim on the 
                                                 
106 Id.  
107 Id. at 763. 
108 Id.  
109 Id.  
110 Id. at 773. 
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grounds that the statute of limitations bars plaintiff’s recovery.114 A 
court may apply equitable estoppel when the plaintiff was not aware of 
his injury at the time it occured.115  
According to Judge Posner in Williams v. Sims, 116 the Seventh 
Circuit outlined a “standard example” of equitable estoppel in Bell v. 
City of Milwaukee.117 In Bell, the court found that on the evening of 
February 2, 1958, two white Milwaukee police officers shot an 
unarmed African American man who fled from them after they 
attempted to arrest him for driving with a broken tail-light.118 One 
officer allegedly stated to the other, “He’s just a damn nigger kid 
anyhow.”119 According to the court, the officers planted a knife on the 
victim, Bell, and claimed that he brandished the knife and confessed to 
a robbery while fleeing.120 Additional police officers allegedly entered 
into a racially-motivated conspiracy to conceal the crime.121 Bell’s 
siblings filed suit against the alleged conspirators in 1979 for civil 
rights violations and various tort claims. Defendants argued that the 
statutes of limitations for Plaintiffs’ claims expired in 1961 and 
1964.122 The court estopped Defendants from defending on the ground 
that the statutes of limitations had expired because Plaintiffs alleged 
that Defendants actively and fraudulently concealed their wrongdoing. 
It held that equitable estoppel is a “far-reaching doctrine” and that the 
key inquiry in determining whether it should apply is whether “the 
defendants’ conduct and representations were so unfair and misleading 
as to outbalance the public’s interest in setting a limitation on bringing 
an action.”123 The court held that the public had a stronger interest in 
                                                 
114 Id.  
115 Id.  
116 390 F. 3d 958, 958 (7th Cir. 2004).  
117 746 F. 2d 1205, 1229-31 (7th Cir. 1984) (reversed on other grounds). 
118 Id. at 1216.  
119 Id.  
120 Id at 1223.  
121 Id.  
122 Id at 1229 
123 Id at 1231.  
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seeing Plaintiffs’ claims litigated than in imposing the statute of 
limitations because, if true, Defendants’ racially-motivated actions 
were so unfair as to carve out an exception to the statue of 
limitations.124 Bell demonstrated that courts should balance the 
interests of the public in punishing Defendant’s wrongdoing with the 
public’s interest in applying the statute of limitations.  
 
B. Equitable Tolling  
 
On the other hand, if the plaintiff knew he was injured and did not 
file a claim within the applicable statute of limitations, equitable 
tolling may be available to him. Judge Posner explained in Cada, if the 
plaintiff reasonably “cannot obtain information necessary to decide 
whether the injury is due to wrongdoing and, if so, wrongdoing by the 
defendant,” he may appeal to the doctrine of equitable tolling to toll 
the statute of limitations for the period of time necessary to obtain the 
information.125 In Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. of New York v. 
Howard Savings Bank, Judge Posner explained, “equitable tolling does 
not require that the defendant have borne any responsibility for the 
plaintiff's having missed the deadline.”126 Thus, equitable tolling 
applies where plaintiff knew he was injured when it happened, and 
equitable estoppel applies where plaintiff did not discover he was 
injured until well after the injury occurred. 
 
VI.  ANALYSIS OF TOLLING DOCTINES IN SLAVE DESCENDANTS 
 
Both the trial court and Judge Posner conceive of Plaintiffs’ 
injuries as slavery. The trial court refers to Plaintiffs’ injuries as “the 
institution of slavery itself,” and states that Plaintiffs “knew or should 
have known that they were being brutalized and wrongfully forced to 
work for people, plantations, companies, and industries without being 
                                                 
124 Id. 
125 Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F. 2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1990). 
126 Fid. Nat'l Title Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Howard Sav. Bank, 436 F.3d 836, 839 
(7th Cir. 2006). 
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compensated.” Judge Posner echoes this sentiment when he declines to 
apply tolling doctrines in one brief paragraph:  
 
It is true that tolling doctrines can extend the time to sue 
well beyond the period of limitations—but not to a century 
and more beyond. Slaves could not sue, and even after the 
Thirteenth Amendment became effective in 1865 suits such 
as these, if brought in the South, would not have received a 
fair hearing. However, some northern courts would have 
been receptive to such suits, and since the defendants are 
(and were) northern companies, venue would have been 
proper in those states. Even in the South, descendants of 
slaves have had decades of effective access to the courts to 
seek redress for the wrongs of which they complain. And 
it's not as if it had been a deep mystery that corporations 
were involved in the operation of the slave system.127 
 
Judge Posner’s assessment of African American access to courts 
seems revisionist, at best. The history of slavery in the North in the 
decades preceding the Civil War renders suspect Judge Posner’s 
reasoning that freed slaves would have received fair reparations trials 
there.128 It is doubtful that in states such as New York, which was the 
locus of a massive international slave trading post, courts would have 
been receptive to claims by blacks against those slave traders for 
reparations. Furthermore, in light of numerous twentieth century 
Supreme Court decisions recounted in this article which denied 
African Americans their most basic rights, and failed to redress the 
harms which still stem from a denial of those rights, it seems naïve to 
believe that any court in the North or South would have been receptive 
to reparations claims. After all, there has never been a successful 
reparations suit. 
                                                 
127 In re African American Slave Descendants Litigation (“Slave 
Descendants”), 471 F. 3d 754, 762 (7th Cir. 2006). 
128 Note the October, 2005 exhibit of the New York Historical Society 
“Slavery in New York” which deems New York the “capital of American Slavery” 
for two centuries on the exhibit’s website: www.slaveryinnewyork.org. 
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Of significance here, however, is how Judge Posner 
mischaracterizes Plaintiffs’ injuries in the same manner the trial court 
did. He states that Plaintiffs have had “decades of effective access to 
the courts to seek redress for the wrongs of which they complain.”129 
To bring any complaint into court, a plaintiff must know she has been 
injured. By rejecting Plaintiffs’ appeal to the court to apply one of the 
various tolling doctrines by stating that Plaintiffs should have brought 
their claim earlier, Judge Posner is also assuming that Plaintiffs’ injury 
is slavery. Judge Posner essentially concludes that since Plaintiffs 
knew they were enslaved, they therefore cannot seek refuge in any of 
the various tolling doctrines.  
The African American slavery reparations cases mentioned in this 
article seek compensation for the institution of slavery generally, so 
Judge Posner’s conclusion is understandable, though inappropriate. 
Unlike prior reparations cases, Plaintiffs here do not seek redress 
merely for the institution of slavery—an institution that was legal in 
the South prior to the Civil War. Plaintiffs claim that Defendant 
companies violated Northern laws against slavery by engaging in the 
business of slavery, and in some cases, actually owning slaves. This 
injury is significantly different from the injury of legal slavery, 
because it changes how the court should apply the various tolling 
doctrines.  
Arguably, a court could properly apply equitable tolling if the 
injury is legal slavery. Equitable tolling is appropriate where a plaintiff 
knew she was injured, but could not reasonably find out within the 
statute of limitations that the injury was the result of wrongdoing, and 
if so, that defendant committed the wrong. Plaintiffs knew they were 
legally enslaved. However, Northern companies, such as Defendants, 
could not own slaves, despite its legality in the South. If Defendants 
committed such a wrong, and Plaintiffs could not reasonably find out 
within the statute of limitations that their enslavement was the result of 
Defendants’ illegal involvement in slavery, equitable tolling could 
apply.  
                                                 
129 Slave Descendants, 471 F. 3d at 762. 
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The stronger argument is that the injury Plaintiffs complain of is 
illegal slavery, though, since Plaintiffs state in their complaint that 
Defendants were Northern companies engaged in slavery in violation 
of Northern laws. Equitable tolling does not apply where the injury is 
illegal, rather than legal, slavery. Plaintiffs argue in their complaint 
that they could not determine Defendant’s illegal involvement in 
slavery because Defendants concealed that information. Thus, if the 
injury is illegal slavery, and Plaintiffs could not find out Defendants 
illegally enslaved them, Plaintiffs could not discover the existence of 
their injury. Equitable tolling applies only where a plaintiff knows she 
is injured, and Plaintiffs here claim they did not know about 
Defendants’ involvement in slavery. This analysis does not apply to 
equitable estoppel, however, where the plaintiff is unaware that her 
injury exists because defendant concealed the injury.  
Only Judge Posner’s final reason for rejecting tolling doctrines, 
that “it’s not as if it had been a deep mystery that corporations were 
involved in the operation of the slave system,” alludes to equitable 
estoppel. By implying that Plaintiffs should have known that 
corporations (and thus, Defendants) engaged in the business of 
slavery, Judge Posner considers the possibility that the moment when 
the statute of limitations accrued was not the time in which Plaintiffs 
were legally subjugated by the institution of slavery, but was instead 
when Plaintiffs discovered that Defendants, who were Northern 
companies, allegedly illegally partook in, and profited from, the 
institution of slavery in violation of Northern laws.  
As Judge Posner considers, the injury here is not that Southern 
plantation owners or Southern companies, for whom it was 
unfortunately legal to own and trade slaves, enslaved Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs claim that Defendants were unjustly enriched by their illegal 
involvement in the slave trade, including slave ownership. If the illegal 
ownership of slaves and illegal involvement in the slave trade caused 
injury to Plaintiffs, and, as Plaintiffs claim, they could not discover 
this injury because Defendants concealed their involvement, then the 
statute of limitations did not accrue until Defendants’ recent 
disclosures. However, Judge Posner neglects to instruct the trial court 
to investigate the possible misconduct by Defendants that deprived 
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Plaintiffs of legal recovery on the grounds that lots of companies 
profited from slavery, so Defendants probably did, too.  
Such an assertion renders accrual-centered tolling doctrines 
toothless. At best, Judge Posner’s assertion assumes that Defendants’ 
profits were made legally, and thus ignores the substance of the injury 
in Plaintiffs’ complaint. At worst, Judge Posner acknowledges that 
Defendants likely engaged in illegal slavery, and completely ignores 
their wrongdoing.  
Determining whether several of the nation’s most well-known and 
often-patronized corporations fraudulently concealed their illegal 
involvement in slavery both to escape prosecution in the Nineteenth 
Century and to maintain their relationship with consumers in the 
Twentieth Century is of enormous public interest, especially where 
such a lawsuit seeks to certify more than ten percent of the public as 
members of the plaintiff-class. Although Judge Posner asserts that Bell 
v. Milwaukee presented the “standard” for determining whether 
equitable estoppel applies, he ignored its balancing test. Bell requires 
the court to balance the gravity of Defendants’ wrongdoing with the 
public interest in setting finite periods for timely claims.130 However, 
instead of considering the public interest in discovering the validity of 
Plaintiffs claims against the well-known and widely-patronized 
Defendants, Judge Posner completely ignores Plaintiffs’ allegations of 
Defendants’ fraudulent concealment. If Plaintiffs here “should have 
known” that corporations, including Defendants, engaged in the 
business of slavery in violation of Northern laws, then Plaintiffs in 
Bell should have known that in the 1950’s white police officers would 
protect fellow white officers who murdered a man because he was 
black. As Bell demonstrates, such assertions are immaterial. According 
to the Bell standard, Judge Posner should have considered whether, if 
Defendants did conceal their illegal involvement in slavery from 
Plaintiffs, that act was so unfair that the public interest demands an 
exception to be carved out of the statute of limitations.  
Furthermore, if Plaintiffs should have known that Defendants 
engaged in the business of slavery, it begs the question, why remand 
                                                 
130 Bell v. City of Milwaukee,746 F. 2d 1205, 1231 (7th Cir. 1984). 
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the consumer protection fraud claims for a trial on whether Defendants 
actively prevented Plaintiffs from obtaining information on 
Defendants’ involvement in slavery? In order to prevail on such a 
claim, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that Defendant sellers 
misrepresented information material to a class of buyers, including 
Plaintiffs, fearing they would lose those buyers if they knew about 
Defendants’ involvement in slavery. The consumer protection claim 
presupposes that such a class of buyers does not generally know that 
corporations it patronizes engaged in the business of slavery. Not only 
does Judge Posner fail to impose the proper balancing test in 
determining whether equitable estoppel should apply, he contradicts 
his own reason for its inapplicability by remanding the consumer 
protection fraud claims. 
Discovery and evidence similar to that in a consumer fraud claim 
would result from a hearing on the issue of whether Defendants should 
be estopped from defending Plaintiff’s claim as time-barred by the 
statute of limitations because both involve evidence of what 
Defendants did or did not conceal from Plaintiffs. Given the equitable 
nature of both Plaintiffs’ claims of unjust enrichment and the 
applicable tolling doctrines, in addition to concerns for judicial 
efficiency and equity, Judge Posner should have remanded the 
equitable estoppel issue to the trial court pending a hearing on 
Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations.  
Reparations are restitutional in nature, thus, they are focused on 
removing from the defendant the spoils of his unjust enrichment. As 
such, the issue of Defendant misconduct demanded a hearing. In Slave 
Descendants, Plaintiffs sought to establish a public trust with 
Defendants’ disgorged profits, not to receive a personal financial 
benefit. Plaintiffs desired a forum in which Defendants’ involvement 
in slavery would be made public, rather than to simply receive 
compensation, because it is in the public interest to know what 
Defendants actually did. The issue of causation is far more 
problematic in the case of reparations claims than it is when Plaintiffs’ 
injuries are recent as with consumer fraud claims. Where Plaintiffs can 
more easily prove causation because less time has passed, Defendants 
have more incentive to settle and avoid an adverse judgment and 
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public scrutiny. Thus, notwithstanding the surviving consumer fraud 
protection claim, Plaintiffs may never receive evidence of Defendants’ 
illegal involvement in slavery without the discovery phase of an 
equitable estoppel hearing. 
Furthermore, the statute of limitations has been an insurmountable 
hurdle thus far in reparations cases. Though it is possible that Plaintiffs 
would not be able to prove a causal connection between their injury 
and Defendants’ conduct at trial, an application of equitable estoppel 
in Slave Descendants would have provided a powerful precedent for 
future reparations claims. As in the case of the Tulsa riots claim, not 
all African American reparations claims are based on slavery. 
Reparations cases based on twentieth century harms, where the statute 
of limitations expired more recently, do not shoulder the same burden 
of causation that do slavery reparations cases. As with the Tulsa suit, 
however, courts often dismiss as time-barred reparations cases based 
on more recent injuries. A hearing on equitable estoppel for an injury 
that occurred over a century ago would demonstrate the truly far-
reaching nature of equitable estoppel, and could provide dispositive 




Judge Posner’s opinion in Slave Descendants gets it wrong with 
respect to both the law and the history it relies on. His opinion fails to 
consider the history of Northern involvement in slavery and the 
enduring nature of slavery and racism on both Northern and Southern 
courts. It also fails to apply the proper standard for equitable estoppel. 
Instead of providing precedent for other reparations suits plagued by 
statute of limitations problems, Slave Descendants supports the 
proposition that African Americans have never had access to a judicial 
remedy for slavery. Denied the solace of tolling doctrines such as 
equitable estoppel, future reparations litigation may abandon all hope 
of remedying the harms of slavery and Jim Crow, and instead focus on 
less problematic claims based on consumer fraud protection statutes.  
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